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Internally Displaced Populations and Terrorism: A Curvilinear Relationship

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Using a cross-national data set of terrorism for 1970-2007, this paper finds that terrorism increases as the size of internally displaced populations goes up, but declines after the number reaches a certain threshold, showing a curvilinear relationship between terrorism and the presence IDP. Dissidents fighting for displaced populations strategize based on, among others, the size of their support base. Terrorism, as a strategy of the weak, is optimal when extremists have little support among their audience. In contrast, engaging the state in armed conflict is an optimal choice when those groups enjoy widespread support. However, when the displaced populations are properly resettled and compensated, they might have no incentives to challenge the state. Therefore, prosperous and highly democratic countries are less likely to experience political violence than others even in the presence of IDP if such populations are treated well.

Keywords: Terrorism, Civil War, Internally Displaced Persons, Democracy, Development

Scholars have found that refugee flows significantly increase the likelihood and counts of transnational terrorist attacks that occur in the host country (Milton, Spencer and Findley 2013), while others (see Choi and Salehyan 2013) exploring the relationship between terrorism and forced migration found evidence that forced migration indeed increases the level of domestic and transnational terrorism in the host countries. Similarly, Choi and Piazza (2014a) find that the presence of internally displaced populations (IDP) increases the levels of suicide terrorism in a country; however, no

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such study exists on either domestic or transnational terrorism. Suicide terrorism, a small subset of the larger set of terrorism, is positively related to the presence of internally displaced populations in a country (Choi and Piazza, 2014a). How does the presence of internally displaced populations in a country affect terrorism in general? How does this factor influence domestic and transnational terrorism in particular?

What causes Terrorism?

Extant literature on terrorism has explored several country-specific factors that influence terrorism. Some scholars suggest that terrorism is rooted in economic deprivation; Gurr (1970) puts forward the idea of 'relative deprivation', where violence is generated when there is a discrepancy between what individuals think they deserve and what they actually receive as a result of deliberate state policy. A rich terrorism literature shows that economic discrimination against minority groups is a robust predictor of terrorism (Lai 2007; Piazza 2011, 2012; Ghatak 2016). Besides numerous country specific studies, several large-N studies (Choi and Piazza 2014b; Ghatak and Gold 2015; Ghatak and Prins 2016) have found that exclusion of ethnic groups from political power and the resultant deprivation of such groups in relation to others drive terrorist violence. Other scholars argue that terrorism is driven by the process of modernization (see Krieger and Meierrieks 2011). Modernization encompasses economic change (e.g., economic development), new forms of communication and lifestyles (e.g., shift from agricultural to urban societies) and new ideas. These factors may create grievances associated with socio-economic and demographic strain, resulting in higher levels of terrorism (see Crenshaw 1981). However, empirical evidence to support such assertion is limited. While some studies show that economic development neither increases nor decreases terrorist violence (Abadie 2006; Krueger and Laitin 2008; Boylan 2010), others find terrorism to increase with economic prosperity (Russell and Miller 1983; Krueger and Maleckova 2003; Berrebi 2007; Lai 2007; Piazza 2011). A few studies (Ghatak and Gold 2015; De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca 2012; Enders, Hoover, and Sandler 2014; Freytag et al. 2011) find an inverted U-shape relationship between GDP per capita and terrorism. Terrorism increases as a country becomes richer, but declines as the country becomes very rich.

The political and institutional order is also argued to matter to terrorism (Krieger and Meierrieks 2011). Democratic regimes can offer non-violent means of resolving conflict (Choi 2010) but often cannot pursue aggressive counter-terrorism measures due to an obligation to civil liberties (Schmidt 1992; Eyerman 1998; Li 2005). Autocratic regimes can capitalize on their capability of repression which may increase the cost of

organizing political dissent (Lai 2007). In fact, a number of scholars find that democracies experience more terrorist violence due to openness as well as constraining ability of their institutions, and in response to their foreign policy preferences (Eubank and Weinberg 1994; Pape 2003; Li 2005; Chenoweth 2010). The debate on terrorism and state strength also seems to be inconclusive (Piazza 2008; Newman 2007). Coggins (2014) finds higher levels of terrorist violence not in states with low levels of human security and weak institutions, but that face political collapse. Interestingly, Ghatak and Prins (2016) find that discriminated populations engender higher levels of domestic terrorism in strong states.

A review of the literature shows that the issue of internally displaced populations as a possible driver of terrorism has largely been ignored. Only one study (Choi and Piazza 2014a) explores the relationship between internal displacement and suicide terrorism. Suicide terrorism as a subset of terrorism mostly occurs in a few countries of Middle East and South Asia, whereas internal displacement of populations is a widespread phenomenon in all parts of the world. Moreover, most scholars studying the relationship between internal displacement and political violence view such displacement of populations as a result of conflict (see Collier 2003; Caplan 2005; Moore and Shellman 2006). Such populations often end up in refugee camps, suffer government abuse and face considerable hardship in life. Insufficient government policy of resettling the internally displaced populations might lead to concrete grievances among them, resulting in increased levels of political violence against a state, its government and institutions. This paper contributes to the terrorism literature by exploring the unexplored relationship between internally displaced populations and terrorism occurring in a country.

What Motivates the Internally Displaced Persons to Challenge a State?

Choi and Piazza (2014a) argue that presence of internally displaced populations in a country might lead to higher levels of terrorism because of the (i) increase in the pool of potential recruits; (ii) human rights abuse of such populations; and (iii) rise in counterterrorism and policing cost of the state. Although Choi and Piazza (2014a) relate such factors to suicide terrorism, all the above factors can lead to terrorism in general. Displacement disrupts normal economic activities of the affected people, destroys families and causes trauma. In the absence of government policy of resettlement and proper compensation, internally displaced populations might have grievances against their government. If the grievances of these people are not adequately addressed by a government, the internally displaced populations are likely

to organize themselves and challenge the state in the form of terrorist violence. Therefore, we would expect terrorism to increase as the size of displaced populations (IDP) goes up.

"Internally-displaced persons (IDPs) are people that have been forced to flee their homes as a result of, or in order to avoid, the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, political instability or natural, economic and humanitarian crises" (Choi and Piazza 2014a). Other than these factors, development projects such as dams, industrialization process and mining also contribute to considerable displacement of populations. IDPs differ from refugees in that they remain within the borders of their own country. Internal displacement has become an enormous problem in recent years. According to the Norwegian Refugee Council's Geneva-based Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), a record-breaking 38 million people had become displaced in the year 2014 within their own country as a result of violence, equaling to 30,000 people a day. The IDMC's Global Overview 2015 reported that the majority of the increase in new displacement during that year was the result of protracted crises in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Nigeria, South Sudan and Syria (see IDMC 2015). Most of these people might hold grievances against either the groups responsible for their misery or the state that failed to protect them, and sometimes both. They provide for a steady pool of recruits to the rebel organizations fighting rival groups and the state. Such cycle of violence wherein people displaced in conflict tend to participate in violent conflict can be seen worldwide. For example, Sunni populations displaced from the Shi'is majority part of Iraq have strengthened the Islamic State in Northern Iraq, leading to higher levels of violence (see Alexander and Alexander 2015).

Internally displaced populations, in the absence of a well-coordinated state policy of resettlement, often end up in refugee camps. Life in refugee camps might be hard and frustrating for the people who have been uprooted from their homes; such camps mostly lack basic facilities such as sanitation, drinking water, electricity and even food at times. Extremist organizations operate in camps and recruit foot-soldiers from the aggrieved people living in hopelessness. For example, the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon displaced large numbers of Shi'is from the South of Lebanon to Beirut, where the nascent Hezbollah recruited them as foot-soldiers (Jaber 1997). Similarly, the Pashtun refugee camps across the Durand line (even inside Afghan border) became recruitment hub for the Mujahedeens fighting the Soviets in 1979 (Abbas 2014).

Human rights violation of the internally displaced persons is another important factor that might encourage some of them to resort to political violence against the state. Members of IDP communities might suffer from abuse by locals and vigilantes from

the populations into which they are settled (Choi and Piazza 2014a). Such populations conflict with IDPs over resource sharing or due to animosities regarding ethnic or cultural identities. Moreover, any protest by IDPs against state policy which often is responsible for their displacement is dealt with severe repression. The example of India can illustrate this point. Sahoo (2005) reports that post-1990 development programs and "land grab" for industrialization have resulted in forced displacement of around 10 million people each year between 1980 and 2000; most (about 75 percent) of these people have been neither adequately compensated nor resettled. Any peaceful protest by these people has invited state repression. In 2007 the police shot dead 14 people who were protesting the notification of acquisition of 25000 acres of land under Land Acquisition Act of 1894 for Special Economic Zone project of Indonesian Salem chemicals in Nandigram, a Muslim majority farming village in the state of West Bengal.[1] In other places like Bhatta-Parsaul in UP, Jagatsinghpur in Orissa, Jaitpur in Maharashtra and so on, the government has used police force to control and intimidate any genuine protest against its land grab polices (Patnaik 2007; Sampat 2008). Interestingly, these areas have since become strongholds of Indian Maoist extremists. State security agencies and pro-government militias often use brutal repression on IDPs in order to prevent them from joining violent groups, resulting in further alienation. Therefore, as the size of IDP community increases, the likelihood of terrorism increases in a country.

However, as the size of the IDP community becomes very large, the level of terrorism is expected to decline. It does not mean that there will be a decline in political violence. On the contrary, the presence of large number of internally displaced populations might, in fact, increase the level of political violence in a country in the form of armed conflict, not in the form of terrorism. Displacement, economic hardship and abuse result in grievances that might motivate internally displaced populations to resort to diverse violent tactics such as terrorism, insurgency and ambush in order to achieve desired policy changes. The rationalist approach to conflict assumes that states and dissidents desire a particular policy outcome but cannot achieve that outcome due to information or commitment problems (Walter 1997; Lake 2002, 2003). This leads actors to pursue a number of strategies such as terrorism and insurgency in attempting to resolve bargaining failures and achieve their desired outcomes (Findley and Young 2012). However, selection of strategies might depend on the extent of support an extremist organization enjoys from the aggrieved people who such organization fights for. Many other environmental factors such as financial resources, availability of foot-soldiers, and the target government's capacity in imposing costs on the extremists

also influence their (extremists) selection of strategy. As rational actors, rebel organizations might change their strategies of violence based on such conditions. Terrorism, targeting unarmed civilians, might be an ideal strategy when extremist organizations are weak relative to the target state and do not have a large support base. If they can increase their capability, those organizations will most probably change their strategy from terrorism to insurgency (directly engaging the state forces) as it is used in armed conflict. Therefore, as the size of IDP community crosses a certain threshold, the violent groups fighting for their cause might transition to armed conflict[2] from terrorism, resulting in a curvilinear relationship between the size of IDP and terrorism.

How does an extremist organization's capability depend of the size of an IDP community? The cooperation of extremists' support base (IDP in this case) is essential for the violent organizations to succeed in their political efforts (Fjelde and Hultman 2014).The civilian population might offer shelter, food and weapons, and could represent a significant source of income for the dissidents. Civilians are also a valuable source of information, for example, about enemy troop movements (Kalyvas 2006). Thus, the size of the aggrieved population whom the extremists fight for might be one of the many determinants of an extremist group's capability.[3] In addition, while group grievance is a motivating factor in insurgency, rationalist models of armed conflict emphasize opportunity. Here, the presence of armed conflict is explained by the extremists' opportunity to extract economic resources among a poor population and evade repression from the target state. Terrorism is a strategy of the weak. Overall, it is their weakness relative to the target state that motivates the targeting of unarmed civilians. The object of terrorism is to bypass the other side's military and to inflict cost on the target population in order to extract political concessions from the state; as direct confrontation would result in certain defeat. The weakness of the terrorist groups also manifests in their selection of weapons[4] and their organizational structure.[5] In their cost-benefit calculations, relative weakness motivates extremist organizations in resorting to terrorist violence. If the size of aggrieved population is small, weak rebel groups are likely to emerge. On the contrary, if the size of the aggrieved population is big,[6] the extremist groups fighting for such population have the possibility to receiving greater moral and material support. In such cases, extremists might change their strategy from terrorism to armed conflict.[7] The above discussion naturally leads to the following hypothesis.

H1: A country will experience higher levels of terrorism as the size of the IDP community increases; terrorism is likely to decline as the size of the IDP community becomes very large.

Research Design and Data

I use a cross-national data set of 172 countries between 1970 and 2007 to test the hypothesis related to the relationship between internally displaced populations (IDP) and terrorism. I test my hypothesis on domestic, transnational and total terrorism (domestic and transitional combined) occurring in a country in different sets of models. In the first set of models, I operationalize domestic terrorism by the number of terrorist incidents in a country-year. The dependent variable in my first set of models is the annual count of domestic terrorist incidents in a country. The data on domestic terrorism would be more compatible with the theoretical objectives of this research.

Internally displaced persons are likely to have grievances against their own government and should have no incentive to attack foreigners. However, some terrorist groups target foreigners in order to generate greater media publicity and attract international attention. Therefore, I use transnational terrorist incidents by country-year as dependent variable in a second set of models. Finally, I also use the total number of terrorist incidents occurring in a location by country-year (domestic and transnational combined) as dependent variable in the third set of models. Enders et al. (2011) formed the most reliable data set on domestic terrorism by deriving their count of domestic terrorist incidents occurring within countries by separating domestic from transnational terrorist incidents published in the widely-used Global Terrorism Database (GTD).[8] Enders et al. (2011: 3) decompose incidents as transnational and domestic, identifying 12,862 transnational terrorist incidents between 1970 and 2007. Subsequently, after isolating uncertain incidents from the remaining terrorist events in GTD, the remaining 46,413 incidents are classified as domestic terrorist events. The data on transnational terrorism also come from the same data set.[9] This differentiated data set covers the period between 1970 and 2007. The undifferentiated data from the same Enders et al. (2011) data set constitute my third dependent variable coded as 'total' in the models. The number of incidents per year measures the existence of terrorism and how widespread terrorism is in a particular country; this has been widely used by scholars in studies of terrorism (Krieger and Meierrieks, 2010; Lai, 2007; Li and Schaub, 2004; Piazza, 2011).

I use one primary independent variable in the models: number of internally displaced populations (IDP). The independent variable is the number of internally displaced populations (in thousands) in a country-year, as derived from the "Forcibly Displaced Populations, 1964-2008" database compiled by Marshall (2008). The data on the variables are log transformed in order to avoid the problem of heteroskedasticity, and lagged by one year to avoid the problem of endogeneity.[10] In addition, a host of controls

that frequently appear in empirical studies of terrorism (Li 2005; Piazza 2011; Wade and Reiter 2007) are also included in all models. The first control variable, political exclusion, is the percentage of a country's discriminated population -- as taken from the EPR data set (Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2009). Politically excluded minority groups are likely to be deprived of several public good provisions, such as education, employment, and other benefits. The data on excluded population are logged to avoid the problem of heteroskedasticity and lagged by one year to avoid the problem of endogeneity.

Next, the Polity IV data set (Marshall and Jaggers 2010) is used to operationalize the control variables regarding regime type. The "Polity Score" captures a regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic) and consists of six component measures that record key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political competition. It also records changes in the institutionalized qualities of governing authority. Using the combined 21-point democracy-autocracy scale, states are coded as one of three regime types: autocratic (-10 to -6), anocratic (-5 to 5), and democratic (6 to 10). This breakdown is common in research using these data (Mansfield and Snyder, 2002). Thus, the empirical models include two categorical variables derived from this scale, anocracy and democracy. Autocracy is the excluded baseline category. Overall, autocratic states might use repressive measures to control terrorism, while democracies and anocracies allow certain civil liberties and legal rights to citizens, perhaps making such systems more vulnerable to domestic terrorism.

Additionally, I also control for a country's population, with the expectation that countries with a greater population might experience more terrorist attacks than less populated ones -- possibly because of the prevalence of potential recruits, and even targets (Abadie 2006; Lai 2007; Li 2005; Piazza 2011; Ghatak and Gold, 2015). The data on this control variable come from the Penn World database (Heston et al. 2012); I use the natural log of population (in millions). Subsequently, I address the relationship between a country's economic development and terrorism, which remains a contentious issue in terrorism research; findings on terrorism are inconclusive on the link between terrorism and poverty. Accordingly, log Gross Domestic Product per capita, in 2005 international dollars, is used as a control variable in our empirical models. The data on this variable come from the Penn World database (Heston et al. 2012).

Elsewhere, Eyerman (1998) and Li (2005) find the age of the current political regime to be a negative predictor of terrorism. The intuitive logic is that frequent regime changes

might prevent the government from pursuing a long-term counter terrorism policy and thereby provide terrorist groups with opportunities to organize. Therefore, regime duration, which is calculated as the number of years the current regime has been in power, is included as a control variable in our models. The data on regime duration come from the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers 2010). Finally, I use a control dummy for the Cold War period. Over the time period that I examine, many terrorist campaigns in the developing world were funded either by Soviet Russia or by the United States during the Cold War period, as a part of the superpower rivalry. So, using a Cold War dummy variable would control for the possible effects of this dynamic, as many studies have taken into account (Choi and Salehyan 2013; Ghatak and Gold 2015). Table Appendix A summarizes the variables used in my models. The variables related to political exclusion, GDP per capita and Regime Durability are lagged by one year in order to avoid simultaneity.

I use random effect[11] panel data models with a negative binomial specification. Because the dependent variable is an event count, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates can be inefficient, inconsistent, and biased (Long 1997). My decision to use negative binomial estimators, rather than ordinary least squares or poisson models, is recommended by some unique features of the dependent variables. Firstly, they do not include negative values. Secondly, they are highly unevenly distributed across cases and years, resulting in a wide difference between the mean and standard deviation. The poisson regression model is often applied to model event counts in which the mean of the distribution is conditional on the independent variables. But, the poisson regression model assumes that the conditional mean of the dependent variable equals the conditional variance; this assumption would be violated in my models, thereby causing underestimated standard errors and spurious statistical significance (Li and Schaub 2004). Ultimately, the Wald tests of the model fit are statistically significant at 99% confidence levels, indicating an appropriate methodological choice.

Additionally, I use separate sets of models of OECD nations. I feel that it is plausible to submit -- based on ideas articulated in our theory section -- that OECD nations will be less likely than others to see a link between the presence of IDP and incidents of terrorism; thus, I create separate table that consider OECD nations. There are several reasons for this hypothesis. First, OECD nations are likely to be stronger economically -- since these nations account for 63% of the world's GDP;[12] therefore, they may be better-suited for providing economic and employment opportunities to the internally displaced persons and resetting them. Second, OECD nations may be more likely to offer democratic political pathways for the expression of grievances, since all 34 OECD

nations are democracies. Beyond these considerations, a stable middle class in the OECD countries will most likely pressure the government in respecting human rights issues (Youngs 2002); this, in turn, could result in a heightened concern for the living conditions of IDP within a given nation. Finally, it also may be the case that more developed nations will have an enhanced ability to monitor potential terrorist activity within their geographic boundaries. For all of these reasons, there is theoretical justification for hypothesizing that OECD nations will not experience an increase in domestic terrorism associated with the presence of internally displaced populations. I also test a set of models for non-OECD countries to compare and contrast those with OECD models.

Moreover, I also present a set of fixed-effect logit models with armed conflict as the dependent variable and the same independent variables used in other models. I have hypothesized a curvilinear relationship between the size of IDP and terrorism; terrorism is likely to decline as the size of IDP becomes very large. However, I argue in the theory section that political violence would, in fact, intensify in the form of armed conflict as the size of IDP community becomes very large. Therefore, the relationship between the size of IDP and armed conflict would be linear, not curvilinear. I use country-fixed effect and year-fixed effect logit models. A minimum threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths defines civil war. The country-year dummy variable for civil war is derived from the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, Version 4 (Themnér and Wallensteen 2013).[13]

Analysis and Results

Result presented in Table 1 shows that the number of internally displaced populations in a country increases domestic terrorist incidents for the period between 1970 and 2007, as shown in Model 1. However, Model 2 shows that the square term of the size of IDP is negatively related to domestic terrorist incidents at a level of statistical significance, exhibiting a curvilinear between the number of internally displaced populations and domestic terrorism in a country. Models 3 and 4 in Table 1 show a similar relationship between the number of internally displaced populations and transnational terrorism. Finally, the relationship between the number of internally displaced populations and total number of terrorist incidents is also curvilinear as shown in Models 5 and 6 in Table 1. Displacement creates grievances against the state and its institutions. These grievances, unless addressed by the concerned state, lead to higher levels of terrorism in a country. Crenshaw (1981) has long argued that discrimination against group/s might be a major precondition that sets the stage for

terrorism over the long run. If a state does not address the issue of displacement by proper resettlement and compensation plans, it amounts to discrimination against such internally displaced populations. Under such circumstances, the displaced populations might resort to political violence in order to pressure the state in redressing their problem. However, as the size of the IDP community becomes very big, rebel organizations fighting for these populations would be strong enough to fight the state forces directly and transition to civil war from terrorism. Therefore, terrorism will decline and political violence will intensify in the form of civil war.[14]

Many of the control variables are statistically significant in the expected directions, as well. The natural log of GDP per capita has a strong, positive, and statistically significant relationship to terrorism. More prosperous states engender higher levels of terrorism. This finding is consistent with earlier findings by scholars such as Piazza (2011). Similarly, Berrebi (2007), studying the terrorist activities of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) between the late 1980s and May 2002, denotes that both higher education[15] and standard of living are positively associated with participation in Hamas or PIJ and with becoming a suicide bomber. Unlike rebels in civil wars, terrorists are ideologically motivated. This requires certain levels of prosperity and the resultant access to education.

I also observe, in all models, that democracy and anocracy are both positively related to domestic terrorism at statistically significant levels. Modern democratic states may be viewed as permissive by terrorists, since security forces are constrained by the rule of law. Although my evidence shows anocratic and democratic political systems experience higher levels of domestic terrorism compared to autocratic systems, I find that democracies confront the highest risk of terrorism. Beyond that, the natural log of population has a strong, positive, and statistically significant relationship to domestic terrorism. More populous states make it easier for groups to operate by increasing the potential pool of recruits (and targets) and increasing the costs to the government for monitoring all its citizens (see Lai, 2007). Finally, I find that cold war increases the levels of terrorism in a country. Terrorism became a part of super power rival during cold war period with both USA and Soviet Union providing ideological and material support to non-state actors in different parts of the world.

Choi and Salehyan (2013) in a study on refugee inflow and terrorism have argued that “strong states may be better able to integrate refugees” and provide better security for civilians from political violence. Weak states, on the other hand, are less able to secure their civilian population and prevent conflict. Because of stronger monitoring capacity and improved ability to resettle IDP, the relationship between internally displaced

populations and violence may be different in developed countries from that in less developed countries. Accordingly, I present models for OECD countries in Tables 2. The Models (1 through 6) in Table 3 show that there is no relationship between the presence of IDP and terrorism in developed countries. The number of internally displaced populations neither increases nor decreases terrorist incidents in developed countries. In explaining these results, I note that developed countries can better resettle internally displaced people than others, and can thus alleviate the grievances of such populations.

Conversely, the relationship between refugees IDP and domestic terrorism exhibit a different pattern for less developed (non-OECD) countries. Models 1 through 6 in Table 3 indicate that the number of internally displaced populations has statistically significant positive relationship with terrorism for less developed countries. The presence of IDP increases terrorist incidents for the period between 1970 and 2007 in the less developed (non-OECD) countries. However, the square terms of the number of internally displaced populations have negative and statistically

TABLE 1. Internally Displaced Populations and Terrorism: Negative Binomial Models for All Countries (1970-2007)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	Domestic	Domestic	Trans.	Trans.	Total	Total
(ln)IDP$_{t-1}$	0.122***	0.251***	0.096***	0.212***	0.116***	0.255***
	(0.011)	(0.050)	(0.011)	(0.052)	(0.010)	(0.046)
(ln)Squared IDP$_{t-1}$	-------	-0.020***	-------	-0.018**	-------	-0.021***
		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.007)
(ln)Pol. Exclusion$_{t-1}$	0.069***	0.070***	0.015	0.016	0.047**	0.047**
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.020)
(ln)GDP pc$_{t-1}$	0.249***	0.251***	0.172***	0.170***	0.228***	0.229***
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Democracy	0.642***	0.637***	0.552***	0.546***	0.575***	0.569***
	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Anocracy	0.608***	0.599***	0.545***	0.530***	0.565***	0.554***
	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.070)	(0.070)
(ln)Population	0.179***	0.177***	0.182***	0.184***	0.161***	0.160***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Regime Dur.$_{t-1}$	-0.001	-0.000	-0.003***	-0.003**	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Cold War	0.266***	0.275***	0.473***	0.477***	0.352***	0.361***
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Constant	-4.652***	-4.675***	-3.456***	-3.457***	-4.094***	-4.110***
	(0.267)	(0.268)	(0.310)	(0.311)	(0.239)	(0.239)
Observations	4,320	4,320	4,315	4,315	4,315	4,315
Mean VIF	1.39	---	1.39	---	1.39	---

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

		(0.034)		(0.040)		(0.031)
(ln)Pol. Exclusion$_{t-1}$	0.225***	0.225***	0.061	0.054	0.160***	0.160***
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.061)	(0.060)
(ln)GDP pc$_{t-1}$	0.471***	0.454***	-0.202*	-0.202*	0.178*	0.170*
	(0.125)	(0.124)	(0.116)	(0.115)	(0.103)	(0.103)
Democracy	0.756*	0.778*	0.948***	0.952***	0.826**	0.839**
	(0.452)	(0.451)	(0.353)	(0.352)	(0.350)	(0.350)
Anocracy	1.511***	1.455***	1.418***	1.359***	1.365***	1.320***
	(0.531)	(0.535)	(0.415)	(0.418)	(0.426)	(0.429)
(ln)Population	0.058	0.072	-0.024	0.000	-0.034	-0.020
	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.070)	(0.071)
Regime Dur.$_{t-1}$	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	0.001	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Cold War	0.730***	0.707***	0.664***	0.659***	0.666***	0.651***
	(0.150)	(0.151)	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.130)	(0.130)
Constant	-6.692***	-6.560***	0.384	0.340	-3.250***	-3.198***
	(1.212)	(1.210)	(1.115)	(1.108)	(0.997)	(0.994)
Observations	766	766	765	765	765	765
Mean VIF	1.89	---	1.89	----	1.89	----

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE 3. Internally Displaced Populations and Terrorism: Negative Binomial Models for Non- OECD Countries (1970-2007)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	Domestic	Domestic	Trans.	Trans.	Total	Total
(ln)IDP_{t-1}	0.129***	0.272***	0.098***	0.248***	0.120***	0.274***
	(0.011)	(0.052)	(0.012)	(0.055)	(0.010)	(0.048)
(ln)Squared IDP_{t-1}	-------	-0.022***	------	-0.023***	-------	-0.024***
		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.007)
(ln)Pol. $Exclusion_{t-1}$	0.055**	0.057**	0.026	0.028	0.045**	0.047**
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.022)
(ln)GDP pc_{t-1}	0.248***	0.249***	0.192***	0.188***	0.225***	0.225***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Democracy	0.485***	0.483***	0.321***	0.318***	0.362***	0.360***
	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.081)	(0.081)
Anocracy	0.482***	0.471***	0.384***	0.365***	0.418***	0.405***
	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.075)	(0.075)
(ln)Population	0.187***	0.187***	0.216***	0.219***	0.175***	0.176***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Regime $Dur._{t-1}$	-0.007***	-0.006**	-0.006**	-0.005**	-0.005**	-0.004*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Cold War	0.099	0.108	0.199**	0.205**	0.117*	0.126**
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Constant	-4.409***	-4.443***	-3.480***	-3.492***	-3.851***	-3.881***
	(0.310)	(0.311)	(0.361)	(0.362)	(0.277)	(0.278)
Observations	3,554	3,554	3,550	3,550	3,550	3,550
Mean VIF	1.26	----	1.26	----	1.26	----

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

significant coefficients; terrorism declines in countries with very large number of internally displaced people.

Conclusions

The hypothesis of this paper is generally supported. Internally displaced populations lead to higher levels of terrorism, both domestic and transnational. However, terrorism declines as the size of the displaced populations becomes large; rebels fighting for such populations change their strategy of political violence from attacking civilians to engaging the state in direct warfare. Therefore, a decline of terrorism does not mean peace, but greater violence in the form of civil war. Interestingly, many rebel organizations use both the strategies of terrorism and civil war simultaneously. So, I do not argue that rebels fighting for the IDP community will totally avoid targeting civilians and solely fight the state in direct warfare. Although it is not uncommon for rebels to solely target combatants, the transition may be marked by adoption of a mixed strategy-targeting civilians and combatants simultaneously. Referring to use of terrorism in civil war, Kalyvas (2004) has argued that "…indiscriminate violence against civilians emerges in civil war because it is much cheaper than its main alternative – selective violence." Such indiscriminate violence is optimal when a steep imbalance of

power exists between the competing actors (dissidents and state), and where and when resources and information are low; however, most political actors eventually switch to selective violence (Ghatak 2016). Given that terrorism is a strategy of the weak, rebel groups might target civilians where and when the state is strong. In many developing countries, rural areas far away from urban centers are marked by an absence of strong law enforcement agencies or state bureaucracy, whereas urban centers are well administered. In such cases, rebel groups fighting in the countryside might use terrorism in the urban centers. For example, Maoist operations are clandestine in most parts of India other than in the Bastar forests,[16] where they have declared a "liberated zone" (Chakravarti 2009). The curvilinear pattern of terrorist incidents observed in this study indicates a gradual transition of strategy.[17]

Next, when the analysis is partitioned to examine developed and non-developed countries, I find that in developed countries (OECD nations) there is no increased likelihood of terrorism in the presence of IDP. Interestingly, presence of internally displaced people (IDP) increases incidences of terrorism across all models for non-OECD countries; such people might hold grudges against the government for poor compensation or badly administered resettlement policies. Their grievances are likely to be translated into political dissent in non-OECD countries, whereas proper resettlement and compensation policies in the developed (OECD) countries remove grievances of the IPD community. Therefore, internally displaced populations might not have an incentive to attack a country or government that provides them compensation and an opportunity to integrate into the country's economic and political mainstream.

From a broader perspective, the findings of this study have important public policy implications. Developed countries that are prosperous enough to accommodate internally displaced populations into their economic systems can reduce the chance of (or motivation to embrace) radicalization as a means of expressing economic discontent. The consideration of whether democratic institutions are institutionalized is relevant to this discussion, under the premise liberal democratic institutions as they are in OECD countries will be more amenable to protecting religious freedoms and other basic political rights; having political pathways to express grievances, it follows, may reduce susceptibility to radicalizing activity. Whether a country is an OECD nation also resonates in conjunction with these points, as more developed nations could be more likely to promote religious and political tolerance. In the end, such tolerance might reduce the need to resort to terrorism as a mode of expressing economic or political grievances.

Note:

[1]West Bengal, UP, Orissa, and Maharashtra are states of Indian Union.

[2]Armed conflicts are fought at different levels of intensity. Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) disaggregate armed conflict based on their technology of rebellion by conceptualizing as the joint military technologies of states and rebels engaged in armed conflict. Three technologies of rebellion emerge at the outset of a civil war. Conventional civil war takes place when the military technologies of states and rebels are matched at a high level; irregular civil war emerges when the military technologies of the rebels lag vis-à-vis those of the state; and symmetric nonconventional war is observed when the military technologies of states and rebels are matched at a low level. However, civil war is considered as legitimate form of conflict irrespective of the levels of its intensity. This paper uses the term 'armed conflict' to encompass these wide range of conflicts.

[3] It is important to mention here that there are many instances when powerful rebel groups have emerged from small number of aggrieved population. For example, the Shining Path in Peru represented only 3 percent of Peruvian population (of Ayacucho region), yet it emerged as one of the most powerful rebel group in history.

[4] Small-scale bombs are the weapon of choice for terrorist groups who employ specialized tactics, in contrast to infantry-type light weapons and artillery used during civil war (Stanton 2013).

[5]The loosely connected networks of small self-contained cells are designed to avoid detection and possible capture by government forces (Dishman 2005).

[6]Very large number of IDP increases the counterterrorism and monitoring cost of the state, allowing rebels to mobilize and operate easily without detection.

[7]However, some rebel groups engaged in armed conflict or civil war might simultaneously use terrorism. Rebels most often strategize their actions on the basis of their capability and the anticipated response from the target state.

[8] Access to the raw GTD database is available online at: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

[9]Enders et al. (2011) data on transitional terrorism are almost identical to ITERATE data on transnational terrorism; this gives credence to the Enders et al. (2011) data.

[10]Terrorism is low intensity violence and hardly displaces people; lagging IDP by one year also addresses the issue of simultaneity.

[11] A) Since there are three trending variables, GDP, population, and political exclusion, which might be picking up some of the time trends, I have used country and year fixed effect models. As the country-year count of domestic terrorist incidents, transnational incidents and total terrorist incidents have 67%, 69.9% and 58.3 zero observations respectively, zero inflated models might be appropriate. Still, I remain skeptical of the zero-inflated model for several reasons. Firstly, one has to assume with the ZINB model that some observations in our dataset (so some countries during some years) have a zero probability of experiencing domestic terrorism. I am hesitant to make such an assumption, because almost every country suffers terrorism at some point in history. Drakos and Gofas (2006), in their piece on underreporting bias in quantitative studies of terrorism, argue against full specification of the inflated equation in zero-inflated negative modeling and recommend instead including only covariates associated with 'certain-zero' countries: regime type. They assume that certain-zero countries appear to be so in the data because they lack free media that would report on terrorist events. In fact, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) data collection method is robust to this type of bias since it does not solely depend upon local media. In the absence of a strong theoretical justification for modeling the zero observation, I am not confident in using ZINB models. However, I have tried ZINB models and the results remain the same, giving me confidence in my model specification. Additionally, I ran country-fixed effect models, year-fixed effect models and country-year fixed effect models. Although fixed effect models delete quite a few observations, the results remain the same. Similarly, I ran year-random effect and country-year random models with the same results; therefore, the results are robust to several modeling choices. B) In order to avoid a possible problem of collinearity and heteroskedasticity due to the inclusion of three trending variables, GDP, population, and political exclusion, the values of these variables are log transformed. Additionally, mean vif for each model (excluding curvilinear models) and a correlation matrix (Appendix Table C) for the explanatory and control variables are presented in the appendix (Appendix Table C), showing no presence of collinearity among the variables.

[12]Source: http://usoecd.usmission.gov/mission/overview.html

[13]Access to the raw Uppsala/PRIO database, along with descriptions and operationalizations of civil war and interstate war, is available online at: http://www.prio.no/Data/Armed-Conflict/.
[14]Table Appendix B presents the results of civil war models. Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 in Table Appendix B show that civil war has strong positive relationship with the number of internally displaced people. However, the square term of the number of IDP is not statistically significant; the likelihood of civil war does not decline even when the size of IDP community is very large. This finding supports the theoretical conjecture that very large size of IDP leads to a decrease of terrorism, but political violence.
[15] Education can be an indirect measure of economic prosperity as the wealthy have more access to education.
[16] In Maoist strongholds in Central India, their civilian targets (like police 'informers' or government sympathizers) often are designed to deter the public from giving information to the security forces.
[17] Populations displaced by civil war might start civil war anew to redress their grievances in created a conflict cycle (Collier, 2003). One limitation in empirically testing this argument is that the models on civil war in the Appendix might suffer from the problem of endogeneity as internally displaced populations are often caused by armed conflict. I have lagged the major explanatory variables to control for endogeneity. However, such empirical problem is largely unavoidable.

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Table Appendix A. Summary Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Dom. Terrorism	5797	7.848	34.669	0	673
Trans. Terrorism	5797	1.730	5.981	0	100
(ln)IDP	4918	0.921	2.179	0	8.699
(ln)Pol. Exclusion	4984	1.865	1.572	0	4.595
(ln)GDP per capita	5696	7.818	1.421	4.394	11.426
Democracy	5798	0.433	0.495	0	1
Anocracy	5798	0.189	0.391	0	1
(ln)Population	5777	1.904	1.746	-2.802	7.170
Regime Durability	5789	22.531	27.852	0	198
Civil War	5797	0.054	0.227	0	1
Combined Terrorism	5797	9.587	38.719	0	719
Cold War	5798	0.513	0.499	0	1

Table Appendix B. Internally Displaced Populations and Civil War: Logit Models (1970-2007)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	Country FE	Country FE	Year FE	Year FE
$(ln)IDP_{t-1}$	0.462***	0.451**	0.462***	0.451***
	(0.051)	(0.186)	(0.040)	(0.091)
$(ln)Squared\ IDP_{t-1}$	------	0.002	------	0.002
		(0.025)		(0.015)
$(ln)Pol.\ Exclusion_{t-1}$	0.277**	0.276**	0.277***	0.276***
	(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.058)	(0.059)
$(ln)GDP\ pc_{t-1}$	-0.376***	-0.376***	-0.376***	-0.376***
	(0.128)	(0.129)	(0.087)	(0.086)
Democracy	0.102	0.104	0.102	0.104
	(0.389)	(0.391)	(0.186)	(0.186)
Anocracy	0.524	0.526	0.524**	0.526**
	(0.376)	(0.367)	(0.158)	(0.158)
(ln)Population	0.419***	0.419***	0.419***	0.419***

	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Regime Dur.$_{t-1}$	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012***	-0.012***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Cold War	1.381***	1.379***	1.381***	1.379***
	(0.342)	(0.343)	(0.165)	(0.162)
Constant	-3.575***	-3.568***	-3.575***	-3.568***
	(0.948)	(0.988)	(0.675)	(0.652)
Observations	4,320	4,320	4,320	4,320

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table Appendix C. Correlation Matrix of the Variables

	(ln)IDP$_{t-1}$	(ln)Pol. Excl$_{t-1}$	(ln)GDP	Democracy	Anocracy	(ln)Pop	Regime Dur.$_{t-1}$	Cold War
(ln)IDP$_{t-1}$	1							
(ln)Pol. Excl$_{t-1}$	0.2677	1						
(ln)GDP	-0.138	-0.2002	1					
Democracy	-0.095	-0.196	0.5587	1				
Anocracy	0.1637	0.0879	-0.1929	-0.4322	1			
(ln)Pop	0.1457	0.1818	0.0593	0.0851	-0.024	1		
Regime Dur.$_{t-1}$	-0.14	-0.1091	0.4555	0.2636	-0.235	0.1336	1	
Cold War	-0.161	-0.001	-0.3015	-0.2137	-0.154	-0.0894	0.0023	1